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She conducted gunnery exercises and took part in carrier task force guard tactics in the Hawaiian area. The ship's anti-aircraft capabilities were enhanced, with ten Bofors 40 mm quad mounts and fifty-one Oerlikon 20 mm single mounts. The tripod mainmast was removed, with the stump replaced by a deckhouse above which the after main battery director cupola was housed.

Attack on Pearl Harbor

One of the new CXAM-1 radars was installed above the cupola. These guns could elevate to 85 degrees and fire at a rate of one round every four seconds. She then conducted refresher training and air defense patrol off the coast of California. As she retired from Attu on 12 May, a patrol plane warned that a torpedo wake was headed for Pennsylvania. She maneuvered at full speed as the torpedo passed safely astern.

Destroyers Edwards and Farragut teamed to hunt down the attacker.

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After 10 hours of relentless depth charge attack, the Japanese submarine I was forced to the surface and was shelled by gunfire from Edwards. Severely damaged, the enemy survived until 13 May, then was sunk by the destroyer Frazier. Torpedo wakes were again sighted on the morning of 14 May, and destroyers conducted a fruitless search for the enemy.

That same morning, Pennsylvania's OS2U Kingfisher seaplanes were launched to operate from seaplane tender Casco in making strafing attacks on enemy positions on Attu. On the afternoon of 14 May, Pennsylvania conducted her third bombardment mission, this time in support of the infantry attack on the west arm of Holtz Bay. She then operated to the north and east of Attu until 19 May, when she steamed for Adak. Rockwell , commanding the Kiska Attack Force.

On 15 August, assault troops landed without opposition on the western beaches of Kiska. By the evening of 16 August, it became apparent that the Japanese had evacuated under cover of fog prior to the landing. She patrolled off Kiska for a time then returned to Adak on 23 August. There she took aboard passengers and departed on 19 September for San Francisco where she arrived on 25 September. She returned to Pearl Harbor on 6 October, and, after debarking passengers, took part in rehearsal and bombardment exercises in the Hawaiian area.

She became the flagship of Rear Admiral Richmond K. The Task Force, comprising four battleships, four cruisers , three escort carriers , transports, and destroyers, approached Makin Atoll from the southeast on the morning of 20 November. Just before general quarters on the morning of 24 November, a tremendous explosion took place off the starboard bow as Pennsylvania was returning to a screening sector off Makin. At almost the same instant, a screening destroyer reported sound contact and disposition, and immediately executed a course change.

For several minutes after the explosion, a large fire lighted up the entire area. Word soon came that escort carrier Liscome Bay had been torpedoed.

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She sank with tremendous loss of life, including the commander of the squadron, Rear Admiral Henry M. Determined night air attacks were made by enemy torpedo planes on the nights of 25—26 November but were repelled without damage to ships of the Task Force. On 31 January , Pennsylvania commenced a bombardment of Kwajalein Island which was continued throughout the day. Landings were made on 1 February, with Pennsylvania joining in bombardment support before and after the landing operations. On the evening of 3 February, she anchored in the lagoon near Kwajalein. The success of the Kwajalein operation was ensured and Pennsylvania retired to Majuro Atoll to replenish her ammunition.

On 12 February, Pennsylvania got underway for operations against Eniwetok. On 17 February, Pennsylvania steamed boldly through the deep entrance into Eniwetok Lagoon with her batteries blazing away.

She steamed up a swept channel in the lagoon to a position off Engebi Island and commenced a bombardment of enemy installations. On the morning of 18 February, Pennsylvania bombarded Engebi before and during the approach of the assault waves to the beach. When Engebi had been secured, Pennsylvania steamed southward through the lagoon to the vicinity of Parry Island , where she took part in a bombardment on 20—21 February, preparatory to the landing assaults. At the commencement of the bombardment, the island had been covered with a dense growth of palm trees extending to the waters edge.

At conclusion of the bombardment, not a single tree remained standing. On the morning of 22 February, she gave bombardment support prior to the landing on Parry Island. She remained at Efate until late April. On 29 April, Pennsylvania arrived in Sydney, Australia. She returned to Efate on 11 May, and then sailed to Port Purvis , Florida Islands, from which she operated to conduct bombardment and amphibious assault exercises.

She returned to Efate on 27 May, and after replenishment of her ammunition, departed on 2 June, arriving at Roi on 3 June. On 10 June, Pennsylvania formed with a force of battleships, cruisers, escort carriers, and destroyers en route for the assault and occupation of the Marianas Islands. As a result of this maneuver, Pennsylvania collided with the high-speed transport Talbot and sustained minor damage.

Talbot put into Eniwetok for emergency repairs. On 14 June, Pennsylvania took part in the bombardment of Saipan preparatory to the assault landings made the next day while she cruised off the northeastern shore of Tinian, conducting heavy bombardment of that island to neutralize any enemy batteries which might have opened fire on the landing beaches of Saipan. On 16 June, she conducted a bombardment of targets on Orote Point, Guam , and then retired to cover the Saipan area.

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Pennsylvania departed the Mariana Islands on 25 June, and after a brief stay at Eniwetok, departed on 9 July to resume support of the Marianas Campaign. From 12—14 July, Pennsylvania conducted a bombardment of Guam in preparation for the assault and landings on that island. On completion of firing the evening of 14 July, she returned to Saipan to replenish ammunition. She returned to Guam on 17 July, and delivered protective fire support for demolition parties.

At the same time she continued deliberate destructive fire on designated targets through 20 July. During the Guam campaign, she fired more ammunition than any other warship in history during a single campaign. On the early morning of 21 July, Pennsylvania took a position between Agat Beach and Orote Peninsula, and commenced a bombardment of beach areas in immediate preparation for the assault while troops and equipment were loaded into landing craft and landing waves were being formed.

After the beachhead was established, she stood by for fire support missions as might be called for by shore fire control parties, continuing this duty until 3 August. From 12—14 September, Pennsylvania took part in the intensive bombardment of targets on the island of Peleliu. On 15 September, she also furnished gunfire support for the landings on that island. She then delivered a devastating fire on enemy gun emplacements among the rocks and cliffs flanking Red Beach on Angaur Island. On 25 September, Pennsylvania steamed for emergency repairs at Manus, Admiralty Islands, entering a floating drydock on 1 October.

Kinkaid , en route to the Philippine Islands. Pennsylvania reached fire support station on the eastern coast of Leyte on 18 October, and commenced a covering bombardment for beach reconnaissance, underwater demolition teams , and minesweeping units operating in Leyte Gulf and San Pedro Harbor. She conducted bombardment missions the next day and supported the landings on Leyte on 20 October.

Gunfire support missions continued through 22 October, including harassing and night illumination fire. Pennsylvania and five other battleships, with cruisers and destroyers of Rear Admiral Oldendorf's force, steamed south and by nightfall were steaming slowly back and forth across the northern entrance of Surigao Strait, awaiting the approach of the enemy.

That night, American motor torpedo boats stationed well down in Surigao Strait made the first encounter with torpedo attacks. Destroyers of the force, on either flank of the enemy's line of approach, followed with torpedo and gun attacks. At on 26 October, West Virginia opened fire, joined shortly thereafter by other battleships and cruisers. The Japanese had run head on into a perfect trap. Rear Admiral Oldendorf had executed the dream of every naval tactician by " crossing the T " of the enemy formation. The cruiser Mogami in company with a destroyer were the only ships that managed to escape.

Rear Admiral Oldendorf's Force did not suffer the loss of a single vessel. Mogami was sunk the next day by aircraft carrier planes. Pennsylvania , sailing at one end of the battle line, was unable to find a target, partly because of her older fire control systems, but also because she was blocked by friendly ships sailing in her line of fire. On 26 October, ten enemy planes made a simultaneous attack on a destroyer close aboard Pennsylvania which assisted in shooting down four planes and driving off the others. On the night of 28 October, she shot down a bomber as it attempted a torpedo run.

She remained on patrol in Leyte Gulf until 25 November, and then steamed to Manus, Admiralty Islands, and thence to Kossol Passage where she loaded ammunition. The Group came under heavy air attacks on 4—5 January, and the escort carrier Ommaney Bay was hit by a kamikaze and destroyed by the resulting fire. Many other ships were damaged. On the morning of 6 January, Pennsylvania commenced a bombardment of target areas on Santiago Island at the mouth of Lingayen Gulf.

That afternoon she entered the Gulf to conduct counter-battery fire in support of minesweeping forces, retiring at night. At daybreak on 7 January, the entire bombardment force entered Lingayen Gulf to deliver supporting and destructive fire. Preliminary assault bombardment was continued the next day.


The New York Times' account of Able noted that while the bomb had exploded with a flash "ten times brighter than the sun" over the target ships, "only two were sunk, one was capsized, and eighteen were damaged. Following the Able detonation, Navy teams moved in to fight fires, reboard the ships, and tow sinking vessels to Enyu for beaching. As this work progressed, diving commenced on the sunken ships for "a full assessment of the damage done by the air blast. Inspection of the ships, recovery of test gauges particularly from Gilliam, which was the highest priority for instrumentation recovery because the ship was the accidental zeropoint for the blast , and underwater photography continued until July 14, when attention turned to the preparations for the Baker test.

The effect of radiation was for the most part ignored; a short news item filed by the Associated Press on July 15 noted that the test animals were "dying like flies Animals that appear healthy and have a normal blood count one day, 'drop off the next day,' an officer said Senator from New Mexico and an observer at the tests, the caisson was suspended 90 feet below the well in the steel landing ship LSM The blast displaced 2.

It was estimated that about , cubic yards of material fell back into the crater, with the remainder dispersed throughout the lagoon. LSM was destroyed; except for a few fragments of the ship that fell on other vessels, no trace of the landing ship was ever found. The bomb's detonation point was within yards of the location of the sunken Lamson and Sakawa.

The failure to locate these vessels during subsequent dive surveys of the lagoon indicates the bomb, moored at a depth of 90 feet in a foot deep lagoon, probably did considerable damage, or possibly completely destroyed them, depending on each wreck's exact location. The badly damaged carrier Saratoga, listing but too radioactive to be boarded by salvage teams, sank within hours, followed by the Japanese battleship Nagato, and LCT Within the next few days, five other landing craft that were damaged in the Baker test were scuttled in Bikini lagoon; another was taken outside of the atoll and sunk.

The destroyer Hughes and the attack transport Fallon, badly damaged and sinking, were taken in tow and beached.

The detonation effect of Baker was greater than Able; reports and interest were rekindled, although total destruction by the bomb had once more been averted. One reporter, William L. Laurence, the "dean" of atomic reporters who had witnessed the detonation of the Trinity test bomb, the Nagasaki bomb drop, and the two Bikini blasts, described a new public attitude as a result of Operation Crossroads. Returning to the United States, Laurence found that while "before Bikini the world stood in awe of this new cosmic force He had expected one bomb to sink the entire Bikini fleet, kill all the animals He had even been told that everyone participating in the test would die.

Since none of these happened, he is only too eager to conclude that the atomic bomb is, after all, just another weapon.

Us navy cruisers

Laurence himself, as well as nearly everyone else involved in the tests, failed to realize or report the insidious effect of the bomb. Far deadlier than the actual blast, in that time of "limited yield" nuclear weapons, was the lasting effect of radiation, confirming once again the fears and prophecies of the nuclear scientists that even seemingly "undamaged" vessels could and would suffer from radioactive contamination.

Decontamination by scrubbing the ships "clean" was only partially successful. The effort to decontaminate the target battleship New York was a case in point:. The main deck forward had not been touched as yet I made a careful survey of the deck, finding the intensity to vary a great deal in a matter of feet. One gets the impression that fission products have become most fixed in the tarry caulking of the planking and in rusty spots in the metal plates.

When the survey was complete the Chief turned his booted, sweating, profane and laughing crew loose with brushes, water, and a barrel of lye. Yet when the hydraulics were done and the deck rinsed clean again, another survey showed the invisible emanations to be present The portly Chief stood watching the dial of my Geiger counter, completely bewildered. The deck was clean, anybody could see that, clean enough for the Admiral himself to eat his breakfast off of.

So what was all this goddam radioactivity? While no extensive deposit of long-life radioactive materials were found on the target ships after the Able test, the Baker test detonation generated more radiation; even the salt in the water, for example, was transformed into a short-lived radioactive material. However, plutonium and other long-lived fission products that emitted beta and gamma rays were the major problem. The reboarding of ships after Able was undertaken after a few hours in some cases. After Baker, only five vessels at the extreme ends of two vessel strings could be boarded.

Access to the rest of the target array was denied.

USS Pennsylvania

By July 26 and 27, crews were able to beach Hughes and Fallon, which were sinking, "but both vessels were radioactive to the extent that taking them in tow The forecastle of Hughes, for example, had a tolerance time of about eight minutes. Initial efforts to decontaminate the ships were hampered by the fact that no plans had been prepared for organized decontamination; "the nature and extent of the contamination of the targets was completely unexpected. Subsequent washings had no measurable effect. Foamite, a water-mixed firefighting foam, was applied and washed off; two washings on Hughes reduced the radiation to levels varying between 2.

Radioactive material adhered to the ships' wooden decks, paint, tar, canvas, rust, and grease; while some of it could be washed off, the only effective means of removal was sandblasting the ships to bare metal, stripping off every piece of planking, and bathing brass and copper with nitric acid. Washing, as the experience with New York demonstrated, did not significantly reduce radiation levels, particularly with crews limited to short periods of exposure.

Only complete removal of the contaminated surface area reduced the radiation. The Navy discovered, too, that "painting over the surface produced no reduction in [beta gamma] activity At the same time, it was hoped that in two-hour shifts crew members could "apply detailed scrubbing, abrasive, and paint removal action as necessary to reduce the radioactivity sufficiently to permit continuous habitation of the ships. By August 5, several ships were being pumped out and "secondary decontamination" of others followed.

On August 24, inspection efforts commenced on several target ships, including dives made on Saratoga, Arkansas, and Pilotfish that continued until August The submarine Skipjack was successfully raised by divers on September 2, and some instruments were recovered from the sunken ships, but work time was limited by radiation hazards. On August 10, orders were issued to cease decontamination efforts at Bikini and prepare the target ships for towing to Kwajalein.

The decision was reached when it was discovered that decontamination generally was not working and was extremely hazardous; the final straw was "the discovery of alpha emitters from samples inside Prinz Eugen" which were not detectable with the monitoring instruments in use at Bikini. Further investigation showed "probable widespread presence of the alpha emitters Since no alpha detectors for general field use were available and the alpha emitters are one of the most poisonous chemicals known, their presence was considered a serious and indeterminate menace The "severe" contamination problem was kept as quiet as possible; according to an August 10 memorandum from the Manhattan Engineer District of the Army Corps of Engineers observer, Col.

Betts, to his boss, Brig. Kenneth D. Nichols, "the classification of this memo can only be explained by the fact that the Navy considers this contamination business the toughest part of Test Baker. They had no idea it would be such a problem and they are breaking their necks out here to find some solution. Thirteen target ships were sent to Pearl Harbor or to the West Coast "for further study of damage and for development of radiological decontamination and safety techniques by the Navy Rounding of ship surfaces and wash-down systems to spray a vessel subjected to fallout and facilitate the rinsing off of the ship were the only Crossroads-induced changes for passive defense against nuclear weapons.

The primary naval modifications after Crossroads were measures to take the bomb to sea as a weapon, leading to nuclear-capable carriers, guided missile cruisers, and submarines. Additionally, there was a demand for new designs of nuclear weapons suitable for carrying in these vessels. In an atmosphere of no adequate defense against nuclear deployment, the Navy, like the rest of the military, embraced nuclear deterrence through the adoption of and subsequent escalation of use of nuclear weapons at sea as a defense.

Decontamination efforts at Kwajalein ceased in September ; work after that focused on removing ammunition aboard the ships. On one such detail, the light carrier Independence was visited and described:. The Independence is a ghost ship--its flight deck blown up, leaving the thick oak planks broken like so much boxwood; its hangar deck blasted down and only the skeleton of its sides remaining. Gun turrets and gangways, twisted, crushed, dangle oversides, grating and creaking with the roll of the ship.

Doors are smashed in and jammed tight against the bulkheads, or blown out altogether, and the rusty water sloshes aimlessly back and forth across the rusty decks. For the most part the radiation is not particularly high, although sometimes these rusty pools will set your earphones singing and shoot your indicator needles off scale. The report named 45 vessels that had been decommissioned after the tests. Blandy also reported he had sought and received permission to sink "a number of the small landing craft damaged in the experiments, pointing out the dangers of possible lingering radioactivity and also The target ships at Kwajalein remained there for two years in a caretaker status.

Soon after the tests, on December 22, , one vessel, the German cruiser Prinz Eugen, capsized and sank and was left in place. Some of the ships--the submarines, for the most part, and some of the landing craft--were sufficiently "cool" to return to duty as training vessels. The other vessels, contaminated by the tests, were subjected to additional analysis but for the most part were simply left as a ghost fleet that was literally too hot to handle. Eventually, this policy was adhered to for the ships themselves.

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The majority of ships, too hot to be decontaminated, were left at Kwajalein, while 13 others were taken to Pearl Harbor, Seattle, and San Francisco for decontamination studies; the three ships towed to San Francisco were Independence, Crittenden, and Gasconade. Dentuda and Parche were considered only "radiologically suspect" and were cleared for preservation and reuse. Four of the submarines could not be decontaminated; Skipjack, Searaven, Skate, and Tuna were sunk as targets off San Clemente, California, in Pearl Harbor received the battleships Nevada and New York.

In all three were towed to sea and sunk as targets in deep water. New York and Nevada were sunk off Hawaii in deep water; Hughes and Pensacola were sunk off the Pacific coast of Washington, and Independence, Crittenden, Gasconade, Salt Lake City, and the four submarines previously mentioned were sunk off California. Nine ships are known to have escaped scuttling or sinking: two submarines, Dentuda and Parche; two LCIs were sold for scrap along with one LCM; and four attack transports-- Cortland, Fillmore, Geneva, and Niagara were transferred to the Maritime Commission and ultimately scrapped by them.

Although a fourth of the total feet numerically, these ships included only two combatant ships and a small fraction of the total tonnage assembled at Bikini for the two blasts. The contaminated or "suspect" support vessels present better statistics; by the beginning of , 80 of the support ships were granted "final radiological clearance. The message of Bikini, while not understood by the public at the time, and only grasped later in hindsight, was clear to the military, which had seen a fleet survive physically but nonetheless lost forever to radioactive contamination.

Blast effect, while impressive, paled next to radiation effect: "From a military viewpoint, the atomic bomb's ability to kill human beings or to impair, through injury, their ability to make war is of paramount importance. Thus the overall result of a bomb's explosion upon the crew If used in numbers, atomic bombs not only can nullify any nation's military effort, but can demolish its social and economic structure and prevent their re-establishment for long periods of time.

With such weapons, especially if employed in conjunction with other weapons of mass destruction, as, for example, pathogenic bacteria, it is quite possible to depopulate vast areas of the earth's surface, leaving only vestigial remnants of man's material works. Ironically, the vestigial remnants of man's material works in the form of the target ships were the first tangible demonstrations of the power of the atomic bomb and the futility of defense against it; as Paul Boyer notes, an awakening slowly resulted from "the navy's determined, frustrating, and ultimately futile efforts to decontaminate the surviving ships by scrubbing, scraping, and sandblasting Public awareness and wariness began to surface in That year, David Bradley, M.

No Place to Hide was a forceful book that subtly told the real message of Bikini; Bradley felt that the Crossroads tests, "hastily planned and hastily carried out In February , The Washington Post published a column by Drew Pearson that termed the test results a "major naval disaster. This is an enormous loss from only two bombs The aircraft carrier Independence This is still dangerous two years after the ship was attacked. It is strangely prophetic that almost all of the target ships were ultimately taken to sea and scuttled in deep water, joining their sisters sunk in the more shallow waters of Bikini.

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  • Once too radioactive to visit, these vessels, with the beta or gamma activity reduced due to radionuclide decay are now the focus of a new look at them and at Crossroads. Ironically, the "nuclear nomads" of the Pacific, presently the absentee owners and managers of many of the vessels from the sunken feet of Operation Crossroads, were, like the ships themselves, harbingers of a nuclear future. They "are not the first, nor will they be the last, to be left homeless and impoverished by the inexorable bomb.

    They have no choice in the matter, and very little understanding of it. But in this perhaps they are not so different from us all. We are, sadly, more akin to the Children of Israel when they left Egypt and wandered through the desert for 40 years. In early , plans for a scientific resurvey of Bikini during that summer were drafted by the Joint Crossroads Committee. A program of biological study was necessary "in order to determine the long-term effects of Test Baker on fish and other marine organisms including corals and calcareous algae Specifically mentioned as high priorities for reassessment were Saratoga, Nagato, Pilotfish, Arkansas, and Apogon.

    The plan was approved, and a group of scientists and technicians from the Navy, Army, the Smithsonian Institution, the U. Fish and Wildlife Service, and other unnamed institutions was placed under the command of Capt. Christian L. Overall command of the resurvey ships was given to Capt. Henry Hederman, USN. Both men were Crossroads veterans. While a classified operation, the resurvey was publicly announced because of a strong desire by the Joint Chiefs to stress "the story of cooperation that exists between civilian and military agencies in the Bikini resurvey work. Proper handling of the Bikini Resurvey story can do much to acquaint the American public with the long-range value of Operation Crossroads.

    The operations plan that they sailed under included an effort, directed by Lieut. Four instruments, an ionization gage, two linear time pressure recorders, and a diaphragm gage, "the exact locations of which are known," were to be recovered at the discretion of Lieut. Additionally, "it is believed that a portion of LSM has been located. If time permits, an attempt will be made by divers to locate this portion and inspect it thoroughly for type of rupture, heat effects, and radioactivity.

    If practicable, an attempt will be made to raise this section for an inspection on the surface. More than dives were made to study blast effects and damage on the wrecks of Saratoga, Apogon, and Pilotfish. The Navy divers reported visibility to be from 15 to 30 feet on the wrecks. However, "divers on the bottom Divers wore pencil dosimeters and three film badges--on the chest, abdomen, and leg--and when hoisted from the water, each diver was "washed down by hose before being hoisted aboard ship. Only observations were made of the ships at Bikini.

    Instrument recovery was not attempted since "after Baker day, recovery operations were carried on with unabated vigor and very considerable success, so that perhaps 80 percent of the instruments were recovered. It is believed, however, that recovery of this instrument would not add materially to the information at hand concerning the air blast in shot Baker.

    Other work accomplished by the resurvey team included detailed geological assessments of reef structures by drilling. Cores and samples were taken of the bottom of the lagoon. Scientists collected samples on the reefs to determine the "existing degree of radioactivity, or [conducted] studies concerned with habitats, food chains, and taxonomic relationships. At the end of August, packing of equipment began for departure. Laboratories ashore were closed and packed by August 27, and the buildings ashore were cleared and locked on August A final inspection was made before the resurvey ships sailed on the 29th.

    The task group was dissolved on the 4th. Cited in Thomas N. Daly, "Crossroads at Bikini," U. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. Cited in Daly, Ibid. Public hearings followed, and on April 19, , the bill was reported to the Senate. The House passed the bill with amendments on June 20; subsequently most changes were removed in a joint conference.

    The bill was signed into law by President Harry S. The bill passed control of atomic energy from the Manhattan Engineer District, and hence the military, to the newly created Atomic Energy Commission, created a military liaison committee, and instituted security provisions to protect against the release of "classified" nuclear secrets. See Vincent C. A dispatch by Hanson W.

    Baldwin to The New York Times, published in the paper's July 25, edition, reported that the target array for Baker, a "tactical situation of the fleet in harbor Baldwin noted the bomb was not used because of the Japanese fleet's near destruction and "no concentration of enemy ships sufficiently large enough to warrant the use of the atomic bomb was ever detected.

    Trinity, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki came as soon as active material and other components were ready--no earlier detonation was ever possible. The remaining ships, some of them half-sunk at Kure or practically inoperable such as Nagato at Yokosuka were one battleship, two carriers, two light carriers CVLs , two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers CLs , and thirty-eight destroyers. Hereafter cited as Shurcliff, "Technical History.

    Also see Vice Admiral E. The Bureau of Ships, when totalling the costs of the target ships, was ordered not to include the cost of armament. Also untallied were modernization, modifications, and repair costs. Betts, USA, to Lt. Herbert B. Nuclear Weapons, p. General Paul Tibbets, then commander of the Composite th Group, which dropped the bomb, blamed the Able miss on crew error. In a telephone interview on December 20, , the pilot, Woody P. Swancutt stressed the high level of training he and his crew had received, the considerable experience of the bombardier, Harold Wood, and post-Able tests with the same crew and bomb sight that consistently dropped "Fat Man" casings close to the target.

    The naming of the two Bikini bombs is a further indication of the need to "humanize" the bomb through a mechanopomorphic process that began with the "Fat Man" and "Little Boy" weapons dropped on Japan. The female names for the Bikini bombs, particularly "Gilda" and its reference to Rita Hayworth, are part of what Paul Boyer terms the "complex psychological link between atomic destruction and Eros" that was evidenced by burlesque houses advertising "Atomic Bomb dancers" in August , the "unveiling" by Hollywood of scantily-clad starlet Linda Christian at poolside as the anatomic bomb" in Life Magazine in September , the French bathing suit "Atome" quickly dubbed the "Bikini" when introduced in and the pop song "Atom Bomb Baby," which Boyer notes made the Bomb a metaphor for sexual arousal.

    Also see the Washington Star, August 22, II, No. III, p. Nelson, Capt. Mooney, ed. National Archives Record Group Also see William S. I, No. Copy on file in RG , Box 28, Folder Hereafter cited as "Report of Director of Ship Material.